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We propose a prepare-and-measure scheme for quantum
key distribution with 2-bit quantum codes. The protocol is
unconditionally secure under whatever type of intercept-and-
resend attack. Given the symmetric and independent errors
to the transmitted qubits, our scheme can tolerate a bit error
rate up to 26% in 4-state protocol and 30% in 6-state proto-
col, respectively. These values are higher than all currently
known threshold values for the prepare-and-measure proto-
cols. Moreover, we give a practically implementable linear
optics realization for our scheme.
Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is dif-
ferent from classical cryptography in that an unknown
quantum state is in principle not known unless it is dis-
turbed, rather than the conjectured difficulty of comput-
ing certain functions. The first published protocol, pro-
posed in 1984 [1], is called BB84 (C. H. Bennett and G.
Brassard.) For a history of the subject, one may see e.g.
[2]. Since then, studies on QKD are extensive. Strict
mathematical proofs for the unconditional security have
been given already [3–5]. It is greatly simplified if one
connects this with the quantum entanglement purifica-
tion protocol (EPP) [3,6–10]. Very recently, motivated
for higher bit error rate tolerance and higher efficiency,
Gottesman and Lo [11] studied the classicalization of
EPP with two way communications (2-EPP). Their pro-
tocol has increased the tolerable bit error rate of channel
to 18.9% and 26.4% for 4-state QKD and 6-state QKD,
respectively. Very recently, these values have been up-
graded to 20% and 27.4% by Chau [12].
The type of prepare-and-measure QKD schemes is par-
ticularly interesting because it does not need the very
difficult technique of quantum storage. In this paper,
we propose a new prepare-and-measure scheme with the
assistance of 2-bit quantum codes. The linear optical re-
alization is shown in Fig.(1,2). In our scheme, Alice shall
send both qubits of the quantum codes to Bob, there-
fore they do not need any quantum storage. Bob will
first check the parity of the two qubits by the polarizing
beam splitter (PBS) and then decode the code with post
selection. The 2-bit code is produced by the SPDC pro-
cess [13], see in Fig.(1).
We shall use the representation of |0〉 =
(
1
0
)
; |1〉 =(
0
1
)
. We denote σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, σy =
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(
0 −i
i 0
)
. These operators represent for a bit flip er-
ror only, a phase flip error only and both error, re-
spectively. The detected bit (or phase) flip error rate
is the summation of σx (or σz) error rate and σy er-
ror rate. The Z,X,Y basis are defined by the basis of
{|0〉, |1〉}, {|0〉 ± |1〉}, {|0〉 ± i|1〉}, respectively.
Main idea. We propose a revised 2-EPP scheme which is
unconditionally secure and which can further increase the
thresholds of error rates given the independent channel
errors. We propose to let Alice send Bob the quantum
states randomly chosen from { 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), 1√
2
(|00〉 −
|11〉), |00〉, |11〉}. As we shall see, these states are just the
quantum phase-flip error-rejection (QPFER) code for the
BB84 state {|0〉, |1〉, 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)}.
In our 4-state protocol, the tolerable channel bit-flip
and phase-flip rate is raised to 26% for the symmetric
channel with independent noise. (A symmetric channel
is defined as the one with equal distribution of errors of
σx, σz , σy.) Note that the theoretical upper bound of 25%
[11] only holds for those 4-state schemes where Alice and
Bob only test the error rate before any error removing
steps. However, this is not true with the delay of error
test. Considering the standard purification protocol [7]
with symmetric channel, one may distill the maximally
entangled states out of the raw pairs whose initial bit-flip
error and phase-flip error are 33.3% . In our 4-state pro-
tocol, we delay the error test by one step of purification
with 2-bit QPFER code. This raises the tolerable chan-
nel flipping rates.
The QPFER code. We shall use the following QPFER
code:
|0〉|0〉 −→ (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2
|1〉|0〉 −→ (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2. (1)
Here the second qubit in the left side of the arrow is
the ancilla for the encoding. This code is not assumed
to reduce the errors in all cases. But in the case that
the channel noise is uncorrelated or nearly uncorrelated,
it works effectively. Consider an arbitrary state α|0〉1 +
β|1〉1 (qubit 1) and an ancilla state |0〉2 (qubit 2). Taking
unitary transformation of Eq(1) we obtain the following
un-normalized state:
α(|0〉1|0〉2 + |1〉1|1〉2) + β(|0〉1|0〉2 − |1〉1|1〉2) (2)
This can be regarded as the encoded state for α|0〉1 +
β|1〉1. Alice then sends both qubits to Bob. In receiving
them, Bob first takes a parity check, i.e. he compares
the bit values of the two qubits in Z basis. Note that
1
this collective measurement does not destroy the code
state itself. Specifically, the parity check operation can
be done by the PBS in Fig.(2): there, states |0〉, |1〉 are
for horizontal and vertical polarization photon states, re-
spectively. Since a PBS transmits |0〉 and reflects |1〉,
if incident beams (beam 1 and 2) of the PBS are both
horizontally polarized or vertically polarized, there must
be one photon on each output beams (beam 1’ and 2’);
if the polarizations of two incident beams are one hori-
zontal and one vertical, one of the output beams must be
empty. After the parity check, if bit values are different,
Bob discards the whole 2-qubit code, if they are same,
Bob decodes the code. In decoding, he measures qubit 1
in X basis, if he obtains |+〉, he takes a Hadamard trans-
formation H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
to qubit 2; if he obtains
|−〉 for qubit 1, he takes the Hadamard transformation
to qubit 2 and then flips qubit 2 in Z basis. Suppose
the original channel error rates of σx, σy, σz types are
px0, py0, pz0, respectively. Let pI0 = 1− px0 − py0 − pz0.
One may easily verify the probability distribution and
error type for the survived and decoded states (qubit 2)
in following table
JCE probability decoded state error type
I ⊗ I p2I0 α|0〉+ β|1〉 I
{I ⊗ σz} 2pI0pz0 α|1〉+ β|0〉 σx
σz ⊗ σz p2z0 α|0〉+ β|1〉 I
σy ⊗ σy p2y0 α|0〉 − β|1〉 σz
σx ⊗ σx p2x0 α|0〉 − β|1〉 σz
{σx ⊗ σy} 2px0py0 α|1〉 − β|0〉 σy
The first column lists the various types of joint channel
errors(JCE) before decoding. {α⊗ β} denotes both α⊗
β and β ⊗ α. According to this table, the error rate
distribution for the survived raw pairs after decoding is:


pI =
p2I0 + p
2
z0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
,
pz =
p2x0 + p
2
y0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
,
py =
2px0py0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
,
px =
2pI0pz0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
.
(3)
With this formula, the phase flip error to the decoded
states is obviously reduced. Note that this formula does
not hold for the correlated channel errors. Even though
the noise of the physical channel is uncorrelated, in car-
rying out the QKD task, we should not use this formula
to deduce the flipping rates of the decoded qubits based
on our knowledge of the physical channel noise, i.e., the
values of pI0, px0, py0, pz0. But we can choose to directly
test the error rate of the survived and decoded qubits
and to see whether formula (3) indeed holds, based on
our prior knowledge of physical channel noise.
Our protocol with linear optical realization. In the BB84
protocol, there are only four different states. Therefore
Alice may directly prepare random states from the set
of { 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉), |00〉, |11〉} and sends
them to Bob. This is equivalent to first preparing the
BB84 states and then encoding them by eq.(1). We pro-
pose the following 4-state protocol with implementation
of linear optics in Fig(1) and Fig(2):
1 Alice prepares N 2-qubit quantum codes with N/4 of
them being prepared in |00〉 or |11〉 with equal probabil-
ity and 3N/4 of them being prepared in 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)
with equal probability. All codes are put in randomly
order. She records the the “preparation basis” as X
basis for code |00〉 or |11〉 ; and as Z basis for code
1√
2
(|00〉±|11〉). And she records the bit value of 0 for the
code |00〉 or 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉); bit value 1 for the code |11〉
or 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉). She sends each 2-qubit code to Bob.
In Fig.(1), any of the above four states can be produced
from the nonlinear crystal by appropriately setting the
polarization of the pump light [15]. 2 Bob checks the par-
ity of each 2-qubit code in Z basis. He discards the codes
whenever the 2 bits have different values and he takes
the following measurement if they have same values: he
measures qubit 1 in X basis and qubit 2 in either X basis
or Z basis with equal probability. If Bob has measured
qubit 2 in X (or ) Z basis, he records the “measurement
basis” as Z (or ) X basis [16] and we shall simply call the
qubit as Z-bit (or X-bit) latter on. If he obtains |+〉|+〉,
|+〉|0〉, |−〉|−〉 or |−〉|0〉, he records bit value 0 for that
code; if he obtains |−〉|+〉, |−〉|1〉, |+〉|−〉 or |+〉|1〉, he
records bit value 1 for that code. In our linear optical
realization, Bob’s detections are done by post selection
in Fig.(2): If beam 1’ and beam 2’ each contains one pho-
ton, beam 1 and beam 2 must have the same bit values.
Otherwise, their bit values must be different. This re-
quires Bob to only accept the events of two fold clicking
with one clicked detector from {D1,D2} and the other
clicked detector from {D3,D4,D5,D6}. All other types
of events must be discarded. Moreover, according to the
above mentioned corresponding rule, to those accepted
events, clicking of D3 or D4 means measurement in Z ba-
sis to beam 2’, corresponding to “X basis” for his record;
also, clicking of D5 or D6 means measurement in X basis
to beam 2’, corresponding to “Z basis” for his record.
The two fold clicking of (D1,D6),(D1,D3),(D2,D5) or
(D2,D3) corresponds to bit value of 0; two fold clicking
of (D2,D6),(D2,D4), (D1,D5) or (D1,D3) corresponds to
bit value 1. 3 Bob announces which codes have been
discarded. Alice and Bob compare the “preparation ba-
sis” and “measurement basis” of each bits decoded from
the survived codes by classical communication. They dis-
card those bits whose “measurement basis” disagree with
“preparation basis”. Bob announces the bit value of all
X-bits. He also randomly chooses the same number of
2
Z−bits and announces their values. If too many of them
disagree with Alice’s record, they abort the protocol. 4
Now they regard the tested error rates on Z-bits as the
bit-flip rate and the tested error rate on X-bits as phase
flip rate. They reduce the bit flip rate in the following
way: they randomly group all their unchecked bits with
each group containing 2 bits. They compare the parity
of each group. If the results are different, they discard
both bits. If the results are same, they discard one bit
and keep the other. They repeatedly do so for a number
of rounds until they believe that both bit flip rate and
phase flip rate can be reduced to less than 5% with the
next step being taken. 5 They then randomly group the
remained bits with each group containing r bits. They
use the parity of each group as the new bits. 6 They use
the classical CSS code [6] to distill the final key.
Note that in this protocol, Since formula (3) is not uncon-
ditionally true, Alice and Bob check the bit errors after
decoding the 2-bit quantum codes. If the detected errors
are significantly larger than the expected values calcu-
lated from eq.(3), they will abort the protocol. That is
to say, if formula (3) really works, they continue, if it
does not work, they abort it. After any round of bit flip
error rejection in step 4, the error rate will be iterated by
equation (1) in ref. [12]. After the phase error correction
in step 5, the new error rate satisfies the inequality of for-
mula (3) of ref. [12] provided that pI > 1/2. The above
steps to remove the bit-flip error and phase-flip error are
unconditionally true since Alice and Bob have paired the
qubits randomly. Even though the errors of the decoded
qubits are arbitrarily correlated, the above steps always
work as theoretically expected.
Given px, py, pz, if there exits a finite number k, after
k rounds of bit-flip error-rejection, we can find a r which
satisfy
r(px + py) ≤ 5%
e−2r(0.5−pz−py)
2 ≤ 5%, (4)
one can then obtain the unconditionally secure and faith-
ful final key with a classical CSS code [6].
In the 4-state protocol, we don’t detect the σy error for
the states decoded from the survived codes, therefore we
have to assume py = 0 after the quantum parity check
and decoding. But we do not have to assume py0 = 0,
actually Alice and Bob never test any error rate before
decoding in the protocol. However, if the channel noise
is symmetric and uncorrelated, after the quantum de-
coding, both σz error (pz) and σy error (py) are reduced,
i.e., the detectable phase error rate has been reduced in
a rate as it should be i.e., eq.(3). We then start from
the un-symmetric error rate with assumption py = 0 and
px, pz being the detected bit-flip rate and phase-flip rate,
respectively. After the calculation, we find that the tol-
erable error rate of bit flip or phase flip is 26% for the
4-state protocol. Moreover, in the case that the channel
error distribution itself is py0 = 0; px0 = pz0, the tolerable
channel error rate for our protocol is px0 = pz0 ≤ 21.7%.
The above protocol is totally equivalent to the one based
on entanglement purification therefore it is uncondition-
ally secure [14]. Here we give a simple security proof.
2’
p
NCu1
u2
PBS
2
1
Alice Bob
1’
FIG. 1. QKD scheme with 2-bit quantum codes. PBS: po-
larizing beam splitter. NC: nonlinear crystals used in SPDC
process, p: pump light in horizontal polarization, u1: unitary
rotator, u2: phase shifter. u1 takes the value of 0, pi/2, pi/4
to produce emission state |11〉, |00〉, |φ+〉, respectively. u2 can
be either I or σz
D3D5D6
RPBS
D1D2
1’
2’1
2
PBS
BS
RPBS
PBS
D4
FIG. 2. Bob’s action in QKD scheme of figure(1). RPBS:
Rotated polarizing beam splitter which transmits the state
|+〉 and reflects state |−〉). BS: 50:50 beam splitter. D rep-
resents for a photon detector. With RPBS, one may measure
the incident beam in {|+〉, |−〉} basis.
Security proof. Consider two protocols, protocol P0
and protocol P. In protocol P0, Alice directly sends Bob
each individual qubits. In protocol P, Alice first encodes
each individual qubits by a certain error rejection code
and then sends each quantum codes to Bob. We denote
encoding operation as Eˆ and parity check and decoding
operation by Dˆ. Bob will first check parity of each code
and decode the survived codes. After decoding, Alice
and Bob continue the protocol. Suppose except for the
operations of Dˆ and Eˆ everything else in protocol P0 and
protocol P is identical and operation Dˆ or Eˆ do not re-
quire any information of the original qubit itself, then we
have the following theorem: If protocol P0 is secure
with arbitrary lossy channel, then protocol P is
also secure. The proof of this theorem is very simple.
Suppose P is insecure. Then Eve. must be able to attack
the final key by certain operation. Denote Eve’s attack
during the period that all codes are transmitted from
Alice to Bob as Aˆ. Eve may obtain significant informa-
tion to final key with operation Aˆ and other operations
3
(Qˆ) after Bob receives the qubits. If this is true, then in
protocol P0, Eve may take the operation of DˆAˆEˆ in the
same period and then send the decoded states to Bob,
with all other operations identical to those in protocol P.
(The time order is from right to left.) To Alice and Bob,
it looks like that they are carrying out protocol P0 with
a lossy channel now, because Eve will have to discard
some of the 2-bit quantum codes after the parity check
in decoding. All final results from protocol P0 with at-
tack QˆDˆAˆEˆ must be identical to protocol P with attack
QˆAˆ, since everything there with the two protocols are
now the same. This completes our proof of the theorem.
Our QKD protocol in previous section is just the modified
Chau protocol [12] with encoding and decoding added.
We can regard our protocol as P and Chau protocol as
P0 in applying our theorem. Since Gottesman-Lo pro-
tocol [11] or Chau protocol [12] are all unconditionally
secure with arbitrary lossy channel, we conclude that our
protocol must be also unconditionally secure.
6-state protocol. Our protocol can obviously be extended
to the 6-state protocol [17]. In doing so, Alice just change
the initially random codes by adding N/4 codes from
{ 12 [(|00〉 + |11〉) ± i(|00〉 − |11〉)]}. This is equivalent to
1√
2
({|00〉 ∓ i|11〉)}. She regards all this type codes as Y-
bits. In decoding the codes, Bob’s “measurement basis”
is randomly chosen from 3 basis, X,Y and Z. All decoded
X-bits, Y-bits and the same number of randomly cho-
sen decoded Z will be used as the check bits. Since the
Hadamard transform switches the two eigenstates of σy,
after decoding, whenever Bob measures qubit 2 in Y ba-
sis, he needs to flip the measurement outcome so that to
obtain everything the same as that in the 2-EPP with
quantum storages [14]. In such a way, if the channel
is symmetric, Bob will find py 6= 0. And he will know
px, py, pz exactly instead of assuming py = 0. This will
increase the tolerable error rate accordingly. In the case
symmetric physical channel, our 6-state protocol toler-
ates the flipping rate up to 30%.
Subtlety of the “conditional advantage”. un-symmetric
effective channel. Although the advantage of a higher
threshold is conditional, the security of our protocol is
unconditional. That is to say, whenever our protocol
produces any final key, Eve’s information to that key
must be exponentially close to zero, no matter whether
Eve uses coherent attack or individual attack. Our pro-
tocol is totally different from the almost useless proto-
col which is only secure with uncorrelated channel noise.
There are two conditions for the error threshold advan-
tage:
(1) The noise of physical channel should be the type
where eq.(3) holds; (2) Eve. is not detected in the error
test, i.e., the result of error test must be in agreement
with the expected result given by eq.(3).
Both conditions here are verifiable by the protocol itself.
The second condition is a condition for any QKD proto-
col. The first condition is on the known physical channel
rather than Eve’s channel in QKD. In our protocol, Eve’s
attack must not affect the error rates detected on the de-
coded qubits if she wants to hide her presence. That is to
say, if Eve hides her presence, all results about the final
key of our protocol can be correctly estimated based on
the known properties of the physical channel, no mat-
ter what type of attack she has used. Given a physical
channel with its noise being un-correlated and symmetric
and higher than the thresholds of all other prepare-and-
measure protocols but lower than that of our protocol, our
protocol is the only one that works. In practice, one may
simply separate the 2 qubits of the quantum code sub-
stantially to guarantee the un-correlation of the physical
channel noise. This is to say, the error threshold advan-
tage of our protocol is actually unconditional in practice.
Loose ends in practice. Multi-pair emission in SPDC and
dark counting of detectors have not been considered. We
believe these issues can be resolved along the similar lines
in the case of BB84 implemented with a weak coherent
light source.
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